PhoneAbility

10. EECMA or ERG?

It would seem that the EECMA is not intended to have regulatory powers of its own, but would provide advice to the Commission on the need for specific actions which the Commission could then decide to initiate using its existing powers. If this is so, then the overlap between the EECMA and the ERG is so great that the case for the new body must be diminished. While the ERG might prove unwilling to urge the Commission to bring infringement proceedings against the Member State of one of its own members, the use of such proceedings is not common and the evidence of any infringement is usually clear cut. In practice, such issues tend to be resolved by negotiation and the ERG might be better placed than the new Authority to assist in this, as it has already demonstrated its ability to do so. In other cases where resort to formal sanctions is not in prospect, it must be questioned whether the ERG would be any less effective than the new body. If it comes to a question of where the loyalties of the ERG may lie, in simple terms ‘who is the poacher and who is the gamekeeper?’, only practice can provide an answer and the principles of ‘better regulation’ ought to favour the simpler approach.

In terms of costs, the ERG is a leaner and fitter body. It has a staff of 10, with plans for an increase to 15, whereas the EECMA would have around 140 employees or secondees. Without more specific information about its role, it is impossible to form a view on whether the EECMA will offer value for money. It may possibly be able to manage the European Numbering Space and the Radio Spectrum allocations better than the CEPT does at present, although the practical benefits will need to be demonstrated, but both of these areas will increasingly be affected by the globalisation of communications and it seems likely that a radically different administration structure will soon be needed.

The Commission claims that a centralised regulatory structure is necessary because there is a growing divergence between NRAs in their interpretation of the law and in the consequent casework decisions. Others have complained that market access for providers of pan-European services is hampered by the fragmentation associated with national decision-making. Recent views put forward by particular NRAs appear to challenge these statements. It is said that national interpretations of EU law in communications regulation are in fact converging and not diverging, due in large part to the harmonising influence of the ERG. The necessity for common procedures for access to European markets for some forms of service offering has been acknowledged. For example, providers of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services are seen to be disadvantaged by the lack of a common regulatory position. The ERG has acted in response to this, and in a Press Release in December 2007 it has announced that its members have given approval in plenary session to a document setting out a Common Position on VoIP regulation.

Other pan-European markets which have been identified as benefiting from common rules on regulation are associated with personal satellite communications, referred to as ‘phones on boats’ and ‘phones on planes’. These must be issues for resolution globally for, as far as the users are concerned, the level of service offered should not be dependent upon location. At the same time, it has to be recognised that national cultures and consumer preferences play a significant part; “consumers prefer to buy from locally-based suppliers”. In the interplay between protecting the consumer and giving the widest possible freedom to purchase innovative and valuable services, the attention given to consumer concerns must reflect these national and regional viewpoints. A system which assembles these viewpoints through local consultation and then aggregates them, in a search for commonality, is likely to come closest to obtaining public approval.

PhoneAbility has a specific interest in the task, as proposed for the EECMA, of acting as a central point for consideration of accessibility issues affecting disabled users. We have adopted the viewpoint that centralised consideration is potentially very valuable as it keeps the issues high on the agenda. That is not the same as looking for centralised solutions, however. Having a central focal point does not inhibit more local consideration – if anything, it should enhance it. On the other hand, application of centralised solutions risks discouraging more peripheral initiatives and, perhaps more importantly, it brings an implication that uniformity is the overall objective, as in ‘one size fits all’. We believe that there could be dangers in associating considerations of accessibility with a highly centralised regulatory body, especially as such a regulator would be constrained to move in tune with the slowest of the 27 European Member States.

Our preference then would be for a model where the best practice of those in the lead can be shared and championed across the EU, without all the Member States being under an obligation to adopt it immediately. Since it will not be the same Member State that takes the lead in every aspect of disability access, this sharing of best practice should result in a developing synergy that is self-sustaining. We have commented in previous papers that greater independence for NRAs will be essential if evolution of services for disabled users is not to be held back by the lowest common factor; the ability to ‘go it alone’ is vital if these services are to be able to be developed in response to user demand. The methods of funding for unprofitable services, in particular, are so varied across the EU that national patterns must be allowed full freedom – unless there are plans for EU subsidy, and even that might come at too great a price. So we welcome the emphasis given to the independence of NRAs in the revision proposals, while noting that independence from national Governments is equally important as independence from the Commission. The NRAs are better placed than any European central organisation to determine users’ needs within their own constituencies, and then to share the information with each other. If the ERG can persuade each of its members to become the centre of expertise upon some designated aspect of communications regulation, and if one or more will take up the accessibility portfolio in its varied aspects, then we shall arrive at a structure which links proximity to the user base with the ability to influence the whole of the European Community – based upon practical demonstration in very many cases. Possibly the EECMA could do this work more effectively than the ERG, but PhoneAbility believes that the case for this has not yet been made.

Contents